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REGULATION OF MULTIPLE TRUSTS - THE NEED FOR
NEW TAX LEGISLATION
by Arthur W. Zeitler
Since the enactment of a sharply progressive surtax, multiple trusts
have been a principal method of reducing income taxes due to two tax ad-
vantages in the creation of such trusts. The first is the multiplication of
the personal exemption for trusts. Since the reduction of the personal
exemption available for accumulative trusts to $100,' this aspect of tax
avoidance has become relatively unimportant. Much more important is the
opportunity to accumulate income at reduced rates by the use of a num-
ber of trusts. The Treasury Department seems to have no objection to in-
come accumulations in separate trusts for separate beneficiaries in situa-
tions where, aside from tax considerations, separate shares in a single trust
would serve as well.' On the other hand, the splitting of income by means
of creating a number of accumulation trusts for the same beneficiary has
concerned the Treasury Department for a number of years.' In addition to
the tax advantages there are many valid nontax reasons for the use of
multiple trusts.' Because such trusts are highly valuable estate planning de-
vices, Congress has been hesitant to prohibit them altogether despite the
frequently occurring tax avoidance abuses. The difficulty has been in
drafting legislation that would be broad enough to control such abuses
without encroaching on the legitimate uses of multiple trusts.
Although the Internal Revenue Service has attempted, in the absence of
adequate legislation, to establish a judicial standard to correct the often oc-
curring abuses in the field of multiple trusts,' efforts in this direction have
been substantially hindered by the recent tax court decision in Estelle
Morris Trusts.' In this decision, the tax court refused to adopt any of the
lINT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 642(b).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3 (a) (4) (1961). See generally INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 665-68.
'The Treasury Department has proposed corrective legislation. See ADVISORY GROUP ON SUB-
CHAPTER J, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT ON ESTATES, TRUSTS, BENEFICIARIES AND DE-
CEDENTS 9 (Comm. Print 1958). The Treasury has also litigated the issue in several instances. See
Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir.
1961); Sence v. United States, 394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. 20
(1968); James S. Reid Trust, 6 T.C. 438 (1946); Charles S. Davis, 37 B.T.A. 587 (1938).
The use of multiple trusts can reduce the actual tax paid by a substantial percentage. For in-
stance, a single taxpayer with no dependents receiving $100,000 per year from personal services and
$100,000 ordinary income from investments pays approximately $156,000 in taxes at present rates.
If all of the investment property were transferred and taxed to a single trust, the saving would be
approximately $22,000 per year. The use of ten trusts, however, would save an additional $41,000.
See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 642(b).
4 One nontax reason for use of separate trusts is that the settlor may wish to select different
trustees to manage certain types of assets or investments. A second reason is that the grantor may
wish to establish one trust for maintenance and another for education with each having separate
fiduciaries. Furthermore, the settlor may also want A to be remainderman in one trust and B
remainderman in a second trust, even though the principal beneficiary may be identical in both
instances.
' Most of the "loopholes" in the multiple trust area have not been litigated. See generally H.
HARRIS, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 110 (1957); 2 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES
1562 (1961); Ervin, Multiple Accumulative Trusts and Related Problems Under the Income Tax,
29 S. CAL. L. REV. 402 (1956).
651 T.C. 20 (1968).
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regulative judicial standards used in other areas of tax law,' and stated
that Congress and not the courts should fashion the rules needed to regu-
late multiple trusts. The decision in Morris clearly indicates the need for
new and effective tax legislation in the field of multiple trusts.
The purpose of this Comment is to trace the historical development of
multiple trust regulation, including the important decision in Estelle Mor-
ris Trusts, and to analyze what type of multiple trust tax legislation would
best solve the complex problems involved.
I. JUDICIAL MULTIPLE TRUST STANDARDS
In response to the failure of Congress to enact adequate legislation,' sev-
eral tests have been used by the courts to determine whether multiple
trusts would be ignored for income tax purposes. Until recently, the "four
corners-intent" test was the only test effectively applied against multiple
trusts; however, the "close scrutiny" test is now being used by several
courts. In addition, a "principal purpose" test has been proposed by the
Treasury Department but has never been adopted by the courts.
The Four Corners-Intent Test. Nearly all tax cases in the multiple trust
field have concerned, to a greater or lesser degree, the problem of intent.
This issue is ordinarily resolved by a determination of the grantor's intent
as evidenced by the writing contained within the four corners of the trust
instrument.9 If it appears from the trust instrument that the grantor ac-
tually intended to create multiple trusts, then the intent is upheld by the
court. This "four corners-intent" approach occupied the attention of the
taxpayer, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts for almost thirty
10
years.
The application of this test by the courts has been ambiguous and at
times inconsistent. The settlor generally must have intended to set up mul-
tiple trusts and in fact must have done so with the forms prescribed by
local property law. 1 The intent to create multiple trusts can be proven
even though there is only a single instrument and the physical assets placed
7Id. at 43.
" Congress has failed to pass a statute dealing with the problems of multiple trusts because of
a great diversity of opinion as to what measures, if any, should be taken to correct the situation.
See Hearings on H.R. 9662 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, 120,
143-44, 147-48, 151-52, 165-69, 175-77, 194-98, 208 (1960).
O Evidence as to the number of trusts intended to be created is usually admitted by the courts
in the following order: (1) the one or several trust instruments; (2) where the instruments are
ambiguous, the trustee can testify as to how the trusts are administered; (3) testimony of the
grantor. If the instrument clearly provides for a single trust, the grantor will not be permitted to
change by testimony what he has otherwise created. See William T. Belcher, 6 CCH TAX CT. REP.
967 (1947).
'oSee United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481 (1936); Commissioner v. Mc-
Ilvaine, 78 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd, 296 U.S. 488 (1936); Wynne v. Commissioner, 77
F.2d 473 (sth Cir. 1935); Lynchburg Trust & Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 292 U.S. 640 (1934); State Say. Loan & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 482
(7th Cir. 1933); Kohtz Family Trust, 5 T.C. 554 (1945); Baiter, Major Tax Savings for Family
in Use of Family Partnership Plus Multiple Trusts, 5 J. TAXATION 212, 216 (1950). But see Fred
W. Smith, 25 T.C. 143 (1955). See generally 1 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 23-26 (2d ed. 1956).
" United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481 (1936); McHarg v. Fitzpatrick, 210
F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Mcllvaine, 78 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd, 296
U.S. 488 (1936); State Say. Loan & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1933).
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in trust are not segregated. In addition, multiple trusts can exist where
there is an undivided interest in a common fund." Although the use of sep-
arate instruments tends to clarify the trustor's intent, it does not guaran-
tee multiple trust treatment. The use of single or plural words may have a
significant bearing on the court's construction of the trustor's intent. In
MacManus v. Commissioner4 the Sixth Circuit held that even though there
was only one capital account, the settlor did not necessarily intend only
one trust. The court emphasized that the grantor, in instructing his trustee
regarding the management of the corpus and the income, had referred to
the word "trusts" twenty times and the word "trust" only once.
However, the use of singular or plural words is only one factor utilized
by the courts in determining the intent of the grantor. In Kohtz Family
Trust" the tax court held that although the word "trust" was used more
often than the plural "trusts," there were numerous other indications that
the grantor intended to create multiple trusts. One factor which has often
been held to be important is the presence or absence in the trust instrument
of directions by the grantor to the trustee to keep a separate fund for each
beneficiary." Provisions in the instrument requiring the trustees to keep
separate and independent accounts and file separate and independent in-
come tax returns have also been held to indicate an intent to create mul-
tiple trusts.'
Close Scrutiny Test. In the 1961 case of Boyce v. United States," the right
of a taxpayer to receive tax benefits from the creation of separate but
identical trusts was first placed before a court. In Boyce ninety trust in-
dentures of identical language were created. The settlor gave the trustee
ninety checks payable to the trustee in the total sum of $17,740. On the
same day, the trustee gave to the settlor ninety checks drawn on his ac-
count as trustee in the same amounts as those given by the settlor to the
trustee. The next day, in consideration for the $17,740 given him by the
trustee, the settlor conveyed title to certain land and buildings to the trus-
tee for the benefit of the ninety trusts. One of the buildings was then
leased back to the settlor. The settlor's son was to be the single, ultimate
beneficiary of all ninety of the trusts. In the ensuing litigation the tax-
payer stated that the sole purpose in attempting to create the ninety trusts
was to avoid income taxes by dividing the income from the trust prop-
erties." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
"McGinley v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1935); James S. Reid Trust, 6 T.C. 438
(1946).
"United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481 (1936).
'4 131 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942).
5 5 T.C. 554 (1945). See also Lynchburg Trust & Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 356
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 640 (1934).
"See, e.g., Charles S. Davis, 37 B.T.A. 587 (1938).
T Fiduciary Trust Co. v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Helms Bakeries, 46
B.T.A. 308 (1942). For a more thorough discussion of the "intent test" see Ervin, Multiple Accu-
mulative Trusts and Related Problems Under the Income Tax, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 402 (1956).




court's holding that, on the basis of the facts, only one trust was created."
There was no evidence in Boyce that the settlor had failed to comply
with the requirements of the "four corners-intent" test." However, the
court pointed out that the application of the "intent test" was limited to
cases involving separate beneficiaries of separate trusts or a single bene-
ficiary of only two trusts." The court then stated that where the "intent
test" is inapplicable, "close scrutiny"'" must be given transactions involv-
ing multiple trusts. Under "close scrutiny," if the transactions are found
to be a mockery of the tax laws, the form will be ignored for income
tax purposes.' The court in Boyce, however, enunciated no criterion for
determining what constitutes a mockery of the tax laws. For example, it
was not clear from Boyce whether a series of trusts with the same bene-
ficiary, carefully administered as separate entities, would be consolidated
for income tax purposes."
The trial court emphasized two well established criteria for determin-
ing when it would examine the creation and administration of trusts with
"close scrutiny" to decide whether or not separate trusts were in fact
created. The first of these indicators involves the situation in which a tax-
payer boldly proclaims that his intent in creating a trust is tax evasion.
The courts will examine the forms used for the accomplishment of such a
purpose with care. If the taxpayer's ingenuity fails, the courts will not aid
him by resolving doubts in his favor. 6 The second indicator leading to
"close scrutiny" by the courts is any transaction involving close family
relationships."
Principal Purpose Test. In Sence v. United States the court of claims fur-
ther confused the question of the proper test for determining the existence
of multiple trusts. In 1953, nineteen declarations of trust were executed
by Sence and his wife with their grandson as the primary income bene-
ficiary of each trust. In their important aspects all the trusts were sub-
'O1d. at 958. The taxpayer loses not only future tax savings, but also can not recoup his initial
expenses incurred in creating such trusts, keeping separate accounts, or filing separate tax returns.
" The trustee insisted that the existence of separate trusts was to be determined solely on the
basis of the "intent test" and that, therefore, the actions of the trustee and the tax avoidance
motive of the settlor should be ignored. The trustee argued that recent decisions had held that
where separate trusts are created by one settlor for a single beneficiary they must be taxed as
separate entities. He further argued that Congress had considered these decisions and attempted to
pass legislation to close the tax loophole, but had failed to do so; thus, the loophole remained and
plaintiff had taken advantage of it. The Government answered that the ninety trusts were a sham
and that tax liability should be determined on the basis of what was actually done in substance
regardless of the form which was employed to avoid the tax. Id. at 952-53.
2 Id.
2' The rule of "close scrutiny" had been previously applied to family transactions where tax
avoidance was the sole motive. See, e.g., Yiannias v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1950);
Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18, 22 (8th Cir. 1937).
24 190 F. Supp. at 957. The sham theory applies the principle that form must yield to sub-
stance. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Yiannias v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 115
(8th Cir. 1950); Belcher v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1947); Doll v. Commissioner,
149 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
"Alkire, Tax Shadows of the Sixties-Highlights of Estate and Trust Income Tax Proposals,
100 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 696 (1961).
20 Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18, 22 (8th Cir. 1937).
"VDoll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
28394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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stantially alike. All of the trusts had the same trustee and each imposed
almost identical duties upon the trustee. The only variations consisted of
the date of the distribution of the income to the principal beneficiary, the
designation of a minor income beneficiary, and the powers of the trustee
with respect to investments.
The report of the trial commissioner to the court of claims set forth the
rule that if "the principal purpose" for the creation of multiple trusts was
tax avoidance, the trusts will, for tax purposes, be consolidated as one.2"
The plaintiffs denied that income splitting was the motivation for the
creation of the multiple trusts. The court rejected the alleged nontax basis
for the creation of the multiple trusts as implausible and found that mul-
tiple trusts had not been created. However, the court of claims appears to
have reached this result on the basis of a test analogous to the "close scru-
tiny" test rather than adopting the trial commissioner's "principal purpose"
test. The court stated that a taxpayer with tax avoidance motivation must
affirmatively show that he created and maintained truly separate trusts be-
fore he can claim that the trusts should be taxed individually and not as
one. Here the court found that the nineteen trusts were in fact admin-
istered as one. As the court noted: "If it is permissible to create separate
trusts solely for tax avoidance reasons, . . . then it is appropriate to require
a taxpayer to turn square corners-to dot his i's and cross his t's . .- in
order to take advantage of the rule.""0
The finding of the trial commissioner that multiple trusts must be con-
solidated for tax purposes if a principal purpose for the creation of the
trusts was tax avoidance cannot easily be reconciled with prior case law."5
It is probably for this reason that the court of claims avoided the issue
raised by the trial commissioner and decided Sence on other grounds. Thus
the "principal purpose" test has never actually been adopted by any
court. However, irrespective of the historical and theoretical doubts as
to the proper applicability of the test, many authors felt that it would
eventually be adopted."5 Nevertheless, the test was clearly rejected by the
tax court in the case of Estelle Morris Trusts."5
II. ESTELLE MORRIS TRUSTS:
REJECTION OF THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE-SHAM DOCTRINE
Estelle Morris Trusts" involved ten irrevocable trusts for two primary
beneficiaries. Ten written instruments were executed, each designated
"Declaration of Trust." Each declaration of trust was identical in form
2Old. at 850-51.
Sold. at 851-52.
SSee Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731
(5th Cir. 1961), where the court felt it necessary to decide the case on the basis of the close
scrutiny test evan though the court had found a tax avoidance motive. The court stated: "[lit has
been held that even though the sole purpose of creating separate trusts was to achieve a reduction
in the tax upon the income of trust property, this would not transgress any right of the Govern-
ment." Id. at 952.
s See ABA SECTION ON TAXATION, REPORT ON COMMITTEE ON INCOME OF TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 85 (1956).
'3 51 T.C. 20, 43 (1968).
4 51 T.C. 20 (1968).
[Vol. 23
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except as to the period of accumulation of income and the date the trust
was to terminate. The declarations gave the trustee power to accumulate
the income from the trust estate for the life of the two primary bene-
ficiaries. However, the trustee was required to distribute income and prin-
cipal to the primary beneficiary of each trust upon written request and a
showing by such beneficiary that he was unable to maintain his accustomed
standard of living. In addition, in case of emergency the trustee was given
the discretionary power to distribute current or accumulated income and
principle to any beneficiary or issue of any beneficiary.
The grantors made initial cash gifts to the trusts at the time of their
creation. These gifts were made by ten separate checks, each of which
was drawn on the personal bank account of the grantors and made pay-
able to the trustee for Trusts 401 through 410 respectively. Ten separate
bank accounts were opened in the name of the trustee and the gifts were de-
posited therein. Ten sets of printed checks were prepared, one for each
account, and each had the name of the trustee and the individual number
of the respective trust printed thereon. At all times separate books of ac-
counts and records were kept. In addition, each trust filed separate tax
returns and issued annual financial statements. While the principal activi-
ties of the Morris Trusts were investments in real property, at no time did
the trusts become involved in any business transaction with the grantors
nor did the grantors receive any money from the trusts. Furthermore, the
trusts did not make loans to each other or otherwise commingle their
assets and funds.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue maintained that the grantors
had created multiple trusts for tax avoidance reasons and therefore ruled
that the trusts should be combined into one. The government character-
ized the trusts as shams which lacked business purpose and substance
apart from the anticipated tax benefit. The argument was similar to the
one offered by the government in Sence. s The petitioners countered by
arguing that each declaration of trust was sufficient to create separate trusts
and that even if tax avoidance was the motive for the creation of the
trusts, consideration of such a motive was irrelevant to the taxation of
trusts.'"
The tax court held that the grantors had created ten trusts, rather than
one, principally for tax avoidance reasons but that such a motive did not
invalidate the trusts." The multiple trusts were thus accorded independent
significance. The court pointed out that Congress had carefully delineated
certain areas of tax law where the tax avoidance motive is the touchstone
of tax liability." However, the court concluded that Congress had taken
3 394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
3651 T.C. 20, 35 (1968).
37 1d. at 44.
3 id. at 39 n.10. See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 306(B),(4), which allows capital gain
treatment on disposition of "section 306" stock only if the plan for such disposition does not have
tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes. Section 532 conditions the applicability of the
accumulated earnings tax on a determination that the corporation was formed for the purpose of
avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other cor-
poration. See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c)(2), 355(a)(1), 357(b).
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no action to restrict the use of multiple trusts on the basis of tax avoid-
ance." Quoting from an earlier case,"0 the tax court said: "We must leave
to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event, must have
wide ramifications .... The validity of the long-established policy of the
Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional procedures in the tax
field is clearly indicated .... ""
The tax court in Morris did not completely overrule all court regula-
tion of multiple trusts in the absence of legislation, but it stated that it
was "required to limit those judicially developed doctrines to the situa-
tions which they were intended to cover." The court thus ruled out any
use of the doctrines of business and economic sham. It noted that business
purpose is often absent in donative dispositions of property and that the
continuing economic and legal viability of the individual Morris Trusts
prevented any application of the economic sham doctrine." The tax court
did, however, seem willing to apply a test analogous to the "close scru-
tiny" test. The court found that the Morris Trust Declaration was in
proper legal form to create ten separate trusts for each beneficiary." Fur-
thermore, the trusts were in all respects treated as separate by both the
grantor and the trustee.
The court distinguished the cases of Boyce v. United States' and Sence
v. United States" by noting that neither case stood for the proposition that
a finding of tax avoidance would invalidate multiple trusts.4 ' The tax court
felt that the decision in Boyce was based on the ground that the ninety
trusts were shams "because they were in fact administered as one trust.
48
Similarly, in Sence, the court of claims expressly reserved the tax avoidance
question since it found that the nineteen trusts were in fact administered
as one. The tax court surmised "that the courts in Boyce and Sence, faced
with multiple trusts created for tax-avoidance reasons, examined the
forms used and the actions taken to see if the several trusts were in reality
what they purported to be in form."" The tax court concluded, on the
basis of past multiple trust cases and legislative enactments, that each
Morris Trust was a "trust" "within the meaning of that term.""0 Thus the
Morris Trusts seemed to have passed the clear scrutiny test while those in
Boyce and Sence did not.
In view of the decision in Estelle Morris Trusts, it now appears that
the Internal Revenue Service will have very limited success in challenging
multiple trusts created for the purpose of tax avoidance. The "four
3o 51 T.C. 20, 43 (1968).
'°American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
41 51 T.C. at 42, citing 367 U.S. at 697.
41 51 T.C. 20, 43 (1968).
4 3 Id. at 43.
44Id. at 40-45.
4' 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961).
46 394 F.2d 84 (Ct. C1. 1968).






corner-intent" test' and the "close scrutiny" test"2 are still available to
attack multiple trusts which fail to meet the standards of each individual
test. Such tests, however, will provide little hinderance for the sophisti-
cated taxpayer. The solution to the problem now lies with Congress.
III. NEw LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Congress is now faced with the difficult but necessary task of drafting
satisfactory multiple trust legislation. Such legislation could be of two
types: explicative or directional. In either case, multiple trusts which fail
to meet the prescribed statutory standards would be consolidated for in-
come tax purposes. Related legislative changes are also necessary in order
to provide thorough protection against tax avoidance. These changes
should include modification of the Internal Revenue Code throwback
rules and the Treasury Department's trust reporting procedure. If an ex-
plicative or directional statute proves to be unacceptable, other legislative
approaches are worthy of consideration.
A. Explicative or Directional Legislation
Explicative. Explicative statutes provide set rules for various factual situ-
ations." In the area of multiple trusts, such legislation would establish
specific rules for determining whether multiple trusts are to be taxed sep-
arately or on a consolidated basis. With an explicative statute, the problem
would be to attempt to insure that this regulation would not render the
selection of multiple trusts prohibitively expensive from a tax viewpoint
in those situations where the settlor has a valid nontax avoidance motive.
However, the possibility that some trusts, which are not established for
tax avoidance reasons, may be subjected to the proposed treatment as mul-
tiple trusts would have to be balanced against the possible difficulties in-
volved in applying subjective standards of identification.
In addition to the problem noted above, an explicative statute would
have two other major disadvantages. First, the draftsmen would probably
have no experience with the many methods of utilizing multiple trusts
for tax avoidance purposes or with the difficulties of attacking multiple
trusts." Second, closely defined limits on taxability invite the tax-con-
scious grantor to forego sound property planning in order to focus on
achieving the maximum tax advantage. On the other hand, the certainty
with respect to taxation which would be achieved through the explicative
statute is of tremendous importance to proper business and property
planning.
Directional. A directional statute would provide a general statutory stand-
ard to be applied by the courts rather than arbitrary technical require-
5 See notes 9-17 supra, and accompanying text.
52 See notes 18-27 supra, and accompanying text.
" Typical of the explicative statutes are the Clifford Trust provisions. See INT. REV. CODE of
1954, 5§ 671-78.
"The necessity of such experience possibly explains why the Clifford Trust statutory provisions
were not enacted until fourteen years after Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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ments to be met without court interpretation. The directional statute
would have two main advantages. First, family property planning would
not be affected when the taxpayer could demonstrate that his use of trusts
was motivated by sound nontax considerations. Second, the tax conscious
grantor would be restrained from using multiple trusts solely to minimize
taxation due to uncertainty as to how far the courts would go in ap-
plying the statute.
Two statutory sections which are directional in nature have already been
enacted to deal with various problems in the similar field of multiple cor-
porations. Section 269 disallows deductions, credits, or allowances in cer-
tain corporate acquisitions where "the principal purpose for which such
acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax."" It
has, however, been unsuccessful in dealing with split-ups and other mul-
tiplications of corporate entities because of its use of the definite article
"the." "The" principal purpose has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that avoidance of taxation must be more important than any other
purpose. Thus, taxpayers are often able to demonstrate an important non-
tax purpose for each entity and avoid application of the statute." Conse-
quently, when section 1551' was enacted to disallow the $25,000 surtax
exemption and the $25,000 minimum excess profits tax credit to multiple
corporations, the indefinite article "a" was used.
B. The Directional Consolidation Approach
Trusts which are created on a multiple basis could be consolidated and
the income taxed as if it were a single trust if they fail to meet a statutory
standard. Of the statutory standards applied in the related multiple cor-
poration area, such as sections 269 and 1551, the "a" principal purpose
directional statute appears to be the most effective. Thus, under a similar
statute multiple trusts could be consolidated for tax purposes if "a" prin-
cipal purpose for their creation is tax avoidance. This would give the Com-
missioner power to tax the separate trust as one by the consolidation of tax
returns.
Beneficiary-Probability-of-Receipt Standard. If the consolidation approach
is to be used it will be necessary to identify the trusts to be grouped. For
example, multiple trusts could be consolidated in any case where a com-
mon beneficiary has a probability of receipt of accumulated income from
several trusts. Such a beneficiary-probability-of-receipt test may give rise
to uncertainty in the determination of the likely beneficiary. However, a
similar prediction of the probable recipient is required in other tax areas."
I TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 269.
6 1d. See generally S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1943).
"
T Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411, 418 (1948).
a" Chelsea Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 840 (1951), afl'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952);
Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951); Berland's Inc. v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 182 (1951).
"
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 1551.
6 See William H. Robertson, 26 T.C. 246 (1956). See also Hearings on Technical Amendments
to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 441 (1957).
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Under this test, multiple trusts would be defined as trusts created by the
same settlor or testator with a tax avoidance intent, the accumulated in-
come of which will probably be passed on to the same beneficiary.
Several problems remain by using the beneficiary-probability-of-re-
ceipt identification standard. There are two situations in which the
identity of the beneficiary cannot possibly be determined with reasonable
certainty. The first occurs if the accumulations are to be paid to a class
of which no potential member is in being at the close of the taxable year.
The second instance arises when the payment of the accumulation lies
entirely within the unhampered discretion of the trustee. In such a case
there may be substantial uncertainty as to which beneficiary will receive
the year's accumulation. A Congressional Advisory Group Report 1 adopted
the view that if there is substantial similarity of identity among the po-
tential beneficiaries, the consolidation provision will apply. In this instance,
the probability-of-receipt test would not be a precondition to the inclu-
sion of the trust in a multiple trust group.
Common Settlor Standard. As an alternative to grouping trusts according
to possible beneficiaries, the set of trusts subjected to treatment as mul-
tiple trusts could be identified by a common settlor. Such an approach,
however, would involve several problems. A could set up a trust for X,
give other property to B, who could also set up a trust for X to escape
multiple trust consideration. In dealing with such a situation, it would
be necessary to determine intent by the use of complicated treasury reg-
ulations. Furthermore, it must be determined whether trusts created by
will should, after the settlor's death, be considered as having a settlor in
common with those created by the settlor before his death. To answer
in the affirmative would render most family dispositive arrangements
subject to treatment as multiple trusts even though the probability of tax
avoidance is slight.
Common Class of Beneficiaries Standard. An alternative identification
standard is the common class of beneficiaries test. Using this test, those
common beneficiaries who have income being accumulated by two or more
trusts created by a common settlor or testator would have the income of
such trusts combined and taxed as a single trust. But if the beneficiaries
have differing interests in the trusts, arbitrary and unfair results could
easily occur. Thus, the beneficiary with a small financial interest would
6' ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER J, 8 STH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT ON ESTATES,
TRUSTS, BENEFICIARIES AND DECEDENTS 9 (Comm. Print 1958). The bill suggested by the Ad-
visory Group was embodied in the Senate Finance Committee version of H.R. Rep. No. 9662.
Essentially this was an attempt to tax offending multiple trusts together as a single trust whether
or not the income was ultimately distributed. With respect to inter vivos trusts, the Advisory
Group recommended the use of the identification standard: "substantially the same primary bene-
ficiary." The proposed statute exempted from its standard as many as three trusts if created at
five-year intervals. In addition, any trust having currently accumulated income or total taxable
income allocated to corpus under $2,000 would also escape consolidation. For a discussion of the
other legislative approach considered during the 85th Congress see note 62 infra. See H.R. REP.
No. 3041, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 641(c) (1959). For the complete discussion of H.R. Rep. No.
3041, see Fillman & Barnet, Recent Proposals on the Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 41 B.U.L.
REV. 35, 37-38 (1961).
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possibly have his income taxed in a higher tax bracket if the income of
the trusts are combined.
C. Modification of the Throwback Rules
The use of a consolidation approach does not of itself provide protection
against all of the uses of multiple trusts. Consideration must be given to
changing the Internal Revenue Code throwback rules." The throwback
rules, adopted in 1954, provide that distributions by a trust in excess of
that trust's distributable net income are stripped of their tax-free character
if income equal to the distribution was accumulated by the trust in the
five prior years." To prevent double taxation of these amounts, the bene-
ficiary may credit the taxes previously paid by the trust as though it had
made down payments of tax on his behalf."5 Certain distributions are ex-
empted from the throwback rule with the result that they cannot be
taxed beyond the amount of the trust's distributable net income." These
exceptions are principally for income accumulated during a beneficiary's
minority," distributions to meet a beneficiary's "emergency needs,"" and
distributions upon the termination of a trust if made more than nine
years after the last transfer to the trust."6
The consolidation approach does not provide adequate protection against
many present multiple trust abuses if trusts are fashioned to accumulate
and distribute in a manner designed to take advantage of these various
limitations on the throwback rules.6 For this reason it is necessary to
modify the present throwback rules. Elimination of the nine-year throw-
back rule" may be necessary to prevent tax evasion by those trusts which
are established to accumulate income at reduced rates for a comparatively
short period of time and then distribute it to the beneficiary as corpus sub-
"TINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 665-68. One legislative approach considered by the 85th Con-
gress was adopted by the House Ways and Means Committee. This was an attempt to prevent mul-
tiple trust abuse by subjecting them to the throwback rules. In effect, this approach would result
in additional taxes on beneficiaries when they receive multiple trust distributions. A new section 669
was proposed under which the distributions of accumulations of certain multiple trusts would be
subject to throwback rules of sections 666 and 668. See H.R. REP. No. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
S 669 (1960). There was to be no escape for final distributions, distributions at twenty-one, at
specified ages or for emergency needs. Multiple trusts were not to be defined as such. Section 669
would begin to operate whenever a grantor creates more than one trust, and one of such trusts
makes a distribution of accumulated income to a beneficiary in a year after another of the trusts has
made such a distribution to the same beneficiary. For example, if A has created three trusts, all of
which accumulate income to beneficiary B, section 669 would not be operative. But, if in 1962 Trust
#2 distributes accumulated income to B, section 669 would come into play. Subsequent distribu-
tions of accumulated income from Trust #1 to B would not be thrown back under section 669,
but such distributions to B from Trusts #2 and #3 would be. See Fillman & Barnet, supra note 61,
at 37-39.
63 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 666(a).
04]B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 364 (3d ed. 1964); see TNT.
REV. CODE Of 1954, § 666(b).
'SINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 665(b).
66 1d. § 665(b) (1).67
Id. 5 665(b)(2).
'8ld. 5 665(b) (4).
69 For example, S establishes two or more trusts to accumulate income for S's son X for ten
years and one day. Upon termination the accumulated income and corpus are to be paid to X.
Assume X is in a high tax bracket. Even if consolidation occurs, the differential will not be cor-
rected since the throwback rule does not apply.
'OINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 665(b)(4).
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ject to gift exemption. Although this device for the accumulation of in-
come at favorable rates is not dependent on the existence of more than one
trust beneficiary, complete treatment of the problem may require this
modification.7'
D. Modification of the Reporting System for Trusts
A final area in which legislation adopting the consolidation approach
must deal is reporting. It is apparent that the Treasury must be informed
of the existence of all trusts potentially classifiable as multiple trusts in
order to evaluate the facts involved. Accordingly, after one trust is cre-
ated the settlor should be required to inform the Treasury of his creation
of additional trusts. The obligation must be placed on the settlor rather
than upon the trustee, since, in cases where a single settlor has created sev-
eral trusts employing different trustees, it is possible that one or more of
the trustees involved may not be aware of the existence of the other
trustees.
Consolidation will raise certain mechanical difficulties if the consolidated
trusts are managed by different trustees or established in different states.
For example, it must be determined which trustee will file the consolidated
return, which will pay the taxes, how the taxes will be apportioned among
the several trusts, and what credits will be given for tax payments or sav-
ings which reflect the earnings or losses of another trust. However, such
problems are not insurmountable and have been resolved in the analogous
area of ancillary and domiciliary administration of decedent's estates."
E. Other Approaches to the Statutory Solution
Penalty Tax. Instead of consolidating the income annually, other possible
legislative solutions include a special penalty tax like those on personal
holding companies or on corporations which improperly accumulate sur-
plus.74 Such a penalty tax, however, produces equally harsh results whether
or not tax avoidance was intended.
71 See Hearings, supra note 60, at 440.
72 For a general discussion of the filing requirements of trustees, see Hinners, Tax Accounting
Problems of Trustees, 47 MArQ. L. REV. 147-49 (1963). Under the 1958 Advisory Committee ap-
proach, the additional tax burden imposed on an offending multiple trust would fall on the trustees
themselves. To alleviate the hardship, the proposed statute provided that where the trustee did
not know that the tax should be computed at the higher rate, as a result of multiple trusts being
taxed as one trust, he would be relieved of personal liability. H.R. REP. No. 3041, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 641 (c) (4) (1959). The House version of the bill provided for a more complete report-
ing system. Proposed section 669(d) would authorize the Commissioner to require such information
"as may be necessary to carry out the purposes" of the section from (1) any person who has
contributed property to two or more trusts, (2) the trustee of any trust, and (3) any beneficiary
of any trust. A proposed amendment would have added a new section 6047 to the Code that would
require every trust that makes a "section 669 distribution" to any beneficiary, to file a return,
"with respect to such beneficiary," setting forth the grantor's name, the name and address of the
beneficiary, the amount of the distribution, and such other information that the Commissioner
might require. See Fillman & Barnet, supra note 61, at 38-40.7
3See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3 (a) (3) (1961).
7 4
1INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 531, 541.
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A Corporate or Capital Gains Type Tax. Another alternative"5 would be
to tax the income from multiple trusts on a consolidated basis at corporate
or other established rates and the accumulation distribution at capital
gains rates. This, however, would add to the complexity of the present
tax law and would produce a need for an examination of the theory of
trust entities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to the difficulty of drafting adequate legislation, it would seem
more desirable for the courts, rather than the legislature, to close the
multiple trust tax avoidance loophole."' Prior to Estelle Morris Trusts the
courts were tightening their position against such tax avoidance. With
Morris, however, the tax court reversed this trend. It seems clear, there-
fore, that a sufficient and effective court standard for correcting the
abuses in the multiple trust field cannot be devised without new and re-
vised legislation.
It appears desirable that a statute should be adopted giving the Com-
missioner power to consolidate the returns of multiple trusts where
tax avoidance has been "a" principal purpose for their creation.7 The
ta" principal purpose test allows the flexibility which is desirable in trust
law, and the probability-of-receipt standard seems to serve adequately in
determining which trusts should be grouped together for purposes of ap-
plying the consolidation-principal purpose test.
If Congress adopts a statute based on the consolidation approach with a
probability-of-receipt standard and with modification of the present
throwback rules, most situations of tax abuse will be reached without de-
feating the valid and justifiable uses of the trust form. However, the fu-
ture may demonstrate that there can be no adequate solution without re-
examination of a more fundamental concept-recognition of the trust as a
separate entity.
75 Ervin, Multiple Accumulative Trusts and Related Problems Under the Income Tax, 29 S. CAL.
L. REV. 402, 432 (1956).
7 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM
1755 (Comm. Print 1960).
77A similar statute, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1551, has been successful in the field of mul-
tiple corporations.
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